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Although many modern studies find large and significant effects of prior colonial status on bilateral
trade, there is very little empirical research that has focused on the contemporaneous impact of empire
on trade. We employ a new database of over 21,000 bilateral trade observations during the Age of
High Imperialism, 1870-1913, to quantitatively assess the effect of empire on trade. Our augmented
gravity model shows that belonging to an empire roughly doubled trade relative to those countries
that were not part of an empire. The positive impact that empire exerts on trade does not appear to
be sensitive to whether the metropole was Britain, France, Germany, Spain, or the United States or
to the inclusion of other institutional factors such as being on the gold standard. In addition, we examine
some of the channels through which colonial status impacted bilateral trade flows. The empirical analysis
suggests that empires increased trade by lowering transactions costs and by establishing trade policies
that promoted trade within empires. In particular, the use of a common language, the establishment
of currency unions, the monetizing of recently acquired colonies, preferential trade arrangements,
and customs unions help to account for the observed increase in trade associated with empire.
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What factors determine the size of trade flows between countries? To assess the 
determinants of bilateral trade flows, many empirical studies employ a standard augmented 
gravity model that includes mass, distance, and a host of economic and political variables often 
including currency unions, tariffs, wars, and exchange-rate regimes. One empirical finding of 
many studies is that a country’s prior colonial status exerts a large and statistically significant 
positive effect on current bilateral trade.
1 This result raises several interesting additional 
questions that, to date, have received comparatively little attention by economists. First, to what 
extent was trade influenced by colonial status when these former colonies were still part of 
formal empires? Second, if we could examine the contemporaneous impact, would membership 
in an empire increase or reduce trade? Third, what are the channels through which colonial status 
impacts trade?  
To gain some perspective on these questions, this paper provides a thorough examination 
of the contemporaneous effect of empire on trade during the Age of High Imperialism, 1870-
1913.
2 Although a few previous studies have attempted to control for the contemporaneous 
effects of empire on trade using historical data sets (Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor, 2003; 
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner, 2003), they did not focus on understanding how empire impacted 
trade, in part because their samples lacked adequate bilateral trade data on colonies and global 
                                                           
1For example, see Baldwin (2005), Glick and Taylor (2006), and Rose (2000, 2002).  
2 This paper also relates to a growing body of scholarship that examines how empires and colonial relationships 
affect economic outcomes (Ferguson 2004; Lal 2001, 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001).Whereas 
some of these studies re-examine the institutional legacies of empire and their impact  on economic development 
while others provide an overall accounting of the economic effects of colonial relationships, the main objective of 
this paper is a narrower one: to provide an empirical assessment of how they affect trade. We acknowledge that our 
empirical approach focuses on total trade flows, and may not account for the extent to which some of the trade 
between metropole and colony was based, not on mutual exchange, but on coercion.    2
trade.
3 To examine empire’s effect on trade, we first construct a new bilateral trade database of 
over 21,000 observations from 1870-1913 that is nearly 20 times larger than existing databases 
for this sample period. We then estimate the impact of empire on trade using an augmented 
gravity model of trade, and examine some channels through which this effect may have operated.  
Our results suggest that being in an empire roughly doubled trade relative to those 
countries that were not part of an empire. Moreover, the positive effect of empire on trade does 
not appear sensitive to whether the metropole was Britain, France, Germany, Spain, or the 
United States, nor does it appear to be sensitive to a variety of different econometric 
specifications or robustness checks (including endogeneity, multilateral resistance, propensity 
score matching, and selection models). We further examined whether tariff policies and 
transactions costs help account for the observed boost in bilateral trade.
4 We find that 
preferential trading agreements, customs unions between colonies and metropoles, empire-based 
currency unions, and sharing a common language increased bilateral trade. Consistent with 
earlier studies, our analysis also confirms that, in most specifications, the gold standard had a 
positive effect on bilateral trade flows during the period 1870-1913; however, the effect of 
joining the gold club is substantially smaller than the empire effect.
5 Although our paper does not 
claim to capture the overall welfare costs or benefits of belonging to an empire, it provides new 
estimates of the contemporaneous effect of empire on trade and examines the mechanisms 
through which this effect may have operated. In addition, our results shed light on the historical 
                                                           
3 Accominotti and Flandreau (2005) and Flandreau (2000) have employed gravity models to examine the effects of 
bilateral trade agreements and currency unions on trade during the nineteenth century. 
4 Relatedly, Ferguson (2002, 2003) has argued that England “enforced” free trade during the gold standard period 
while other countries moved towards more protectionist policies near the end of the century. 
5 In a similar vein, Ferguson and Schularick (2004) find a large empire effect for British colonial bonds during the 
classical gold standard period. Membership in the British Empire significantly reduced the cost of capital for 
colonial borrowers since the mother country guaranteed the bonds of its possessions. Flandreau and Zúmer (2004) 
find that adherence to the gold standard did not lower the cost of capital for sovereign borrowers during the gold 
standard period.   3
origins of the large legacy effect of empire often reported in studies examining recent bilateral 
trade flows.   
  In the next section, we review the empirical literature on bilateral trade, present an 
augmented gravity model of trade, and describe the data we use to test it. Section III provides 
empirical estimates of the effects of empire, non-empire currency unions, and the gold standard 
on bilateral trade. Section IV identifies the channels of empire and the effects of these 
mechanisms on bilateral trade. The last section offers some concluding comments and discusses 
how empire may have imparted a positive effect on trade. 
 
II. Explaining Bilateral Trade Flows During the Classical Gold Standard Era 
 
A. Empirical Research on Bilateral Trade 
 
  Empirical research has drawn attention to the effects of policies, institutions, and 
geography on trade. Using augmented “gravity” models of trade, economists have examined the 
importance of tariffs, transport costs, exchange-rate volatility, and transactions costs in 
explaining the cross-country variation in bilateral trade flows. Numerous studies utilizing the 
gravity model framework (with data from different time periods and for different country 
samples) have reported on the costs of trade-policy frictions, the tyranny of distance, and the 
benefits of being part of a common currency area (Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (hereafter 
“EFT”), 2003; Glick and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2000). Reviewing the empirical evidence and 
performing a meta-analysis of earlier studies, Rose (2004) finds that belonging to a currency 
union has a positive and statistically significant effect on trade, and that this result appears robust   4
to various econometric specifications, definitions of currency union, measures of distance, 
exchange rate volatility, and country samples.
6  
EFT (2003) has argued that historical episodes, such as the gold standard era and the 
interwar period, may be even better suited for testing the effects of currency unions on trade 
since there was considerable variation in trade flows that existed during these periods and since 
the gold standard represented “the formation of the largest currency arrangement in history.” 
Using quinquennial panel data for the period 1870-1910, Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2003) 
(hereafter “LCM”) test for the effects of currency unions and gold-standard membership on 
bilateral trade. After controlling for other influences such as distance, language, and a common 
border, they find a large, positive effect for historical currency unions, similar to what Rose and 
others find using more recent samples, as well as a large effect from gold-standard membership. 
EFT (2003) and Flandreau and Maurel (2001) report similar results for historical currency 
unions. 
One puzzle that arises from this empirical literature is that exchange-rate volatility 
appears to be unimportant in explaining bilateral trade flows; some studies have found that 
exchange rate volatility impacts trade negatively, but no consensus has emerged. Even in studies 
where the coefficient is negative, the size of the effect is generally small, and the statistical 
significance varies widely.
7 Many of the gravity model studies (including those examining 
historical periods) include a currency union indicator variable as well as a measure for exchange 
rate volatility as independent variables. If we assume that multicollinearity is not a severe 
problem, then the high degree of statistical significance on the currency union indicator variable 
must reflect a benefit other than exchange rate stability. Rose (2000) suggests that currency 
                                                           
6 See Baldwin (2005) for a more recent survey. 
7 Edison and Melvin (1990) review the empirical studies.   5
unions could also reduce transaction costs that arise from operating with various currencies, and 
that they provide a more serious and durable commitment than simply having a fixed rate. 
Nevertheless, he professes ignorance as to why the estimated effects of currency unions on trade 
are so large: “It is wisest to conclude that we simply don’t know why a common currency seems 
to facilitate trade.” (Rose, 2000, p.24). This leaves open the possibility that currency union 
dummy variables are proxying for omitted influences.
8  
As we suggested in the introduction, one institutional factor that may have affected 
bilateral trade flows in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that has received 
little attention in previous empirical studies is empire. The notion that trade and empire are 
linked is certainly not new. Scholarly debate reaches back at least a century to the era of High 
Imperialism, when France, Germany, and Great Britain (and to a lesser extent Russia, Portugal, 
Belgium, and the United States) renewed their quest for territorial acquisition. Even though the 
British Empire, which spanned five continents, was still unrivaled during the 19
th century, 
continental European countries began to more actively challenge Britain’s role on the world 
stage in the latter half of the century. New imperial powers sought overseas territories to 
complement their growing economies, which had been stimulated by the industrial revolution. 
Colonial acquisitions during this phase of expansion included Britain extending its holdings in 
Burma, Malaysia, and Africa, France consolidating its Indo-Chinese Empire and its foothold in 
Madagascar, and Germany carving out an empire in Africa. The Age of High Imperialism also 
included the United States, which had acquired the Philippines and Hawaii after its war with 
Spain. 
                                                           
8 Although studies examining the period 1870-1913 confirm the salutary effects of currency unions on trade, they 
provide little direct evidence that the gold standard reduced transaction costs or payments frictions.    6
A careful reading of the economics and history literatures suggests a variety of reasons 
why membership in an empire could have affected trade flows during the gold standard era 
(Bairoch, 1989; Ferguson, 2002; Frieden, 2006; Lal, 2004; Porter, 1999). These include 
preferential trade policies and other transaction costs, which arise from monetary arrangements, 
developing marketing or distribution networks, or sharing a common language. In order to 
determine whether trade among empire members differed from non-empire countries and to 
assess the relative importance of empire versus other institutional factors, such as currency 
unions and monetary regimes, we now turn to estimating an augmented gravity model of trade 
for the Age of High Imperialism. 
 
B. Gravity Model of Bilateral Trade 
 
  The gravity model is the workhorse empirical model of studies examining trade flows, 
and continues to be used widely by economists due in part to its straightforward implementation 
and theoretical underpinnings.
9 In its simplest form, the gravity model captures two main forces 
affecting trade: mass (a force of attraction) and distance (a force of resistance). Mass (measured 
here by the size of countries) is proportional to trade whereas distance varies inversely. The 
model thus predicts that, all else equal, larger economies ought to trade more than smaller 
economies, and those that are located closer to each other will also experience greater trade. The 
second prediction seems particularly relevant to our sample period, since transportation costs 
declined dramatically during the nineteenth century and appear to have been an important driver 
of trade during this period (EFT, 2002; O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999). 
                                                           
9 There are a variety of theoretical models used to justify the implementation of a gravity model of trade. See 
Deardorff (1998), Evenett and Keller (1998) and Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (1998) for discussion and additional 
references.   7
We augment this basic model with an additional set of covariates to capture the effects of 
differences in geography, institutions, tastes, and preferences on bilateral trade. In particular, 
previous studies have argued that, holding other factors constant, having a common border ought 
to boost trade while being landlocked will reduce trade with other countries. Following earlier 
work, we include a measure of exchange-rate volatility since more volatility ought to reduce 
trade. Finally, we include historical-institutional variables: whether countries were on the gold 
standard, whether they were part of a “formal” currency union, and whether they were part of an 
empire, all of which may have boosted trade between countries. Given our greatly expanded 
trade database, our model will also allow us to comment on the reliability of previous empirical 
studies focusing on currency unions and gold standard membership during the late nineteenth- 
and early- twentieth centuries. Our basic estimation equation takes the following form: 
 
(1) ln(BITRADEijt) = β0 + β1ln(RRiRRj)t +  β2lnDistanceij + β3Lndlckij + β4Borderij +  
β5ExVolatilityijt + β6ln(PopiPopj)t + β7Warijt + β8Goldijt  + β9NONEMPCUijt + 
β10Empireijt + εijt, 
 
where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, and other variables are defined as follows: 
  
•  BITRADEijt denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time t;
10 
•  RR is railroad track miles; 
•  Distance in miles between i and j; 
•  Lndlck is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair dyad (0,1, or 2); 
•  Border is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a border; 
•  ExVolatility is exchange rate volatility; 
•  Population is a nation’s population; 
•  NONEMPCU is a binary variable which is unity if both countries are part of either the 
Latin or Scandinavian currency unions; 
•  Gold is a binary variable which is unity if i and j both are on the gold standard; 
•  War is a binary variable which is unity if countries i and j are at war;  
•  Empire is a binary which is unity if both countries are part of the same political empire;  
•  β are estimated coefficients; 
•  and ε is a white noise error term capturing other influences on bilateral trade.  
                                                           
10 The average value of real bilateral trade is either the average value of one or two dyadic trade pairs, depending on 
data availability.    8
 
For this study, the key coefficients of interest are β8 - β10, which show the effects of the gold 
standard, non-colonial currency unions, and empire on trade. We estimate equation (1) using a 
variety of econometric specifications: pooled ordinary least squares and fixed-effects models. 
The fixed effects model, or within estimator, is equivalent to adding a complete set of dyad-pair 
or country-specific intercepts to the estimating equation (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The 
dyad or country-pair fixed effects are designed to capture bilateral trade resistance. Time 
dummies can also be added to the dyad fixed effects models to control for annual shocks that 
impact bilateral trade flows. Country-fixed effects are included to capture the idea that each 
country may have a different general resistance to trade. The country-fixed effects can also be 
interacted with year dummies to allow for time-varying multilateral resistance to trade such as 




To estimate equation 1, we created a new, large database of annual bilateral trade that 
draws most extensively on a consistent set of British statistical sources published by the Board of 
Trade. In particular, we relied on numerous volumes of the Statistical Abstract for the United 
Kingdom, the Statistical Abstract for the Several British, Colonies, Possessions, and 
Protectorates, and the Statistical Abstract for the Principal and other Foreign Countries for the 
period 1870 to 1913. Some additional data for French colonies is from the Tableau General du   9
Commerce Exterieur. Overall, the data consist of more than 21,000 bilateral trade observations 
and 880 distinct country pairs or dyads.
11 
The trade data we collected from British Board of Trade publications are converted into 
current pounds using annual exchange rates from the Global Financial Database and Ferguson 
and Schularick (2004). We deflated the data using the UK PPI and expressed the figures in 
₤2000.
12 Although we would like to have included GDP to measure “mass” in our gravity model, 
reliable annual estimates for a wide range of non-OECD countries prior to 1914 (including 
smaller colonies) are scarce. We therefore used population to capture mass. Total railroad miles 
are employed to measure a country’s transportation network that proxies for internal transport 
costs that might affect bilateral trade flows. These data series (as well as population) are from 
Banks (1976) and the aforementioned Board of Trade publications. Data on (log) distance in 
miles are from Rose (2002) and an online distance calculator that employs U.S. Geographical 
Survey information.
13 Data on when countries joined the gold standard and joined the Latin and 
Scandinavian Monetary Unions are from Flandreau and Muriel (2001), Bae and Bailey (2003), 
Ferguson and Schularick (2004), Meissner (2005), and Officer (2004). We computed exchange-
rate volatility following the methodology of Rose (2000), but using the exchange rate sources 
listed above.
14 We limit our definition of empire to include only formal empires and only those 
with more than one dependency, which rules out Sweden-Norway, but otherwise initially code 
                                                           
11 The colonies included in the sample are Aden, Algeria, Australia (New South Wales, Western Australia, 
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria), Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium Congo, Bermuda, British Guiana, 
British Honduras, Brunei, Canada, Ceylon, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dutch Guiana, Egypt, Falkland Islands, Fiji, 
French Guiana, French Indochina, Gambia, German East Africa, German SW Africa, German West Africa, 
Gibraltar, Gold Coast, Guadeloupe, Hawaii, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Labuan, Lagos, Madagascar, Maldives, 
Malta, Martinique, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands East Indies, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, New Zealand, 
Newfoundland, Nyasa, Philippines, Portonovo, Portuguese West Africa, Puerto Rico, Reunion, Sarawak, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa (Natal Province, Cape Province, and Transvaal), Southern Nigeria, 
St. Helena, St. Pierre/Miquelon, Straits Settlement, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunis, Uganda, UK East Africa, and 
Zanzibar.  
12 We thank Moritz Schularick for generously sharing his data with us. 
13 We use information from www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java to calculate great circle distance.   10
data for all empires that existed during this period and for which trade data existed.
15 We use 
information on empire affiliation from the Correlates of War Database (COW) described in 
Sarkees (2000), Olson (1991), O’Brien (1991), and the online historical encyclopedia available 
at http://regiments.org/nations/index.htm. Following Glick and Taylor (2006), the COW database 
is also used to code interstate conflicts between bilateral trading partners during the gold 
standard period. 
 Our database significantly improves upon the trade data used in earlier studies of the 
classical gold standard period in that it is better suited for sorting out the relative impact of 
belonging to a monetary standard or an empire. The first reason is its sheer size. To date, the 
most comprehensive bilateral trade database for the gold standard period, at least in terms of 
country coverage, is LCM (2003), which augmented Barbieri’s (1996) trade data with 
information from general statistical compendiums.
16 It is roughly 20 times smaller than the one 
we have constructed. Flandreau and Muriel (2001) use annual data, but limit it to a sample of 
sixteen European countries, and EFT (2002) uses only one year of data from the pre-World War 
I period.  
Our data are superior to LCM in both dimensions of the panel – number of years and 
number of country pairs. LCM (2003) constructed trade for five-year intervals from 1870-1910 
whereas our trade data are annual. Moreover, nearly 70 percent of the observations in LCM 
come from just four years. Perhaps even more significant is that the early years in the sample are 
drawn overwhelmingly from intra-European trade. For example, in 1875, 70 percent of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 Rose (2000) computes exchange-rate volatility as the standard deviation. 
15 Belgium, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and Russia also had colonial empires during this period. We have very limited 
bilateral trade data for the Belgian, Italian, Japanese, and Portuguese colonial empires. We do not have any bilateral 
trade data for members of the Russian Empire. As a result, we could not consider these empires in the empirical 
analysis.    11
observations are European trade pairs. Even in later periods, only a small portion of the sample 
involves trade pairs that are both non-European and non-US. This is an important omission 
considering that non-European/non-US and colonial trade constituted more than 21 percent of 
world trade in 1903 and nearly 23 percent of world trade in 1913 (Colonial Tariff Policies, 
1922). Hence, existing databases are insufficient in country and colony coverage to permit an 
analysis of empire on trade. 
In contrast, our database contains the universe of readily available bilateral trade data 
reported in the British Board of Trade Statistics, which contains a significant portion of non-
European, non-US, and colonial bilateral trade flows. This distinction is nontrivial if one is 
attempting to estimate the impact of belonging to an empire and joining the gold standard. In this 
case, it is important to have identifying variation in the cross-section and time-series coming 
from two different sources: (1) trade pairs that consist of colonies and non-colonizers and (2) 
colonies that are both on and not on the gold standard. Since our database provides both types of 
identifying variation we should be able to provide new insight into the importance of empire and 
monetary arrangements for trade. 
 
III. Analysis of Bilateral Trade Flows, 1870-1913 
 
A. Gravity Model Estimates 
 
 
  Table 1 displays pooled, ordinary least squares regressions with clustered standard errors 
(since we cannot assume that εijt is independent over the country pair or dyad). The most basic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 Barbieri’s (1996) data set was merged with data from at least a dozen other sources to create LCM (2003). The 
authors do not describe how they reconciled the differences in statistical presentation of data across sources and 
countries.   12
specification explains approximately 40 percent of the variation in bilateral trade flows. Most 
variables enter with the correct expected signs and are, for the most part, statistically significant 
at conventional levels. In terms of geographical influences on trade, all else constant, sharing a 
border boosts bilateral trade whereas being landlocked or far away from your trading partner 
reduces trade flows. Most of the specifications also show that larger countries (as measured here 
by population and railroad networks) trade more. Finally, with respect to our institutional 
variables, being part of an empire, being on the gold standard, or belonging to a non-empire 
currency union all seem to have significant positive effects on bilateral trade flows. For example, 
being part of an empire resulted in more than 2.5 times as much trade (270 percent) compared to 
those areas that were not part of an empire. In the initial specification, those countries on the 
gold standard realized a boost in their bilateral trade, although the effect is relatively small (less 
than 20 percent), when compared to the effect on empire. On the other hand, being a member in 
a currency union increased trade by more than 90 percent. We find little evidence that interstate 
conflicts reduced bilateral trade during the gold standard period. This may reflect the fact that the 
gold standard period is generally considered a period of economic and political stability 
characterized by the absence of a global conflict.
17  Indeed, there are only 29 dyads exhibiting 
conflict between bilateral trading partners in our sample. Interstate conflict probably did not have 
an effect on bilateral trade until the outbreak of World War I, as shown by Glick and Taylor 
(2006).  
  Column 2 adds year dummies to the initial specification while Column 3 additionally 
includes exchange rate volatility. The basic tenor of the results remains unchanged. Countries 
that share a border have higher trade and countries that are landlocked or far away from its 
                                                           
17 The Age of High Imperialism (1870-1913) is also part of the period that is commonly referred to as Pax 
Britannica (1825-1913), the era of British peace.   13
trading partner have lower bilateral trade flows. Countries with greater population and more 
railroad miles also have larger trade flows. Membership in an empire more than doubles trade 
and belonging to the gold standard or a non-empire currency union boosts trade by 30 and 86 
percent, respectively. Exchange rate volatility does not have a statistically significant effect on 
bilateral trade flows. Including exchange rate volatility, however, reduces the sample size by 
more than 50 percent since we do not have data on bilateral exchange rates for all trade pairs in 
our sample.
18 Interstate conflict generally does not have a statistically significant effect on 
bilateral trade.  
Table 2 examines alternative specifications of the regression model and performs some 
robustness checks to provide additional information on the size and significance of the empire 
effect. Column 1 considers whether the empire effect is significant for all the major empires that 
existed in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. We coded separate indicator 
variables for whether dyads were part of the British, Spanish, French, German, or American 
empires. The statistically significant and positively signed coefficients on all the empire indicator 
variables suggest that empire consistently boosted trade, but as the point estimate indicates, the 
effects were not uniform across empires. As we discuss later in the paper, differences across 
empires in terms of their effects on empire may relate to metropoles requiring their colonies to 
establish common tariff policies, other trade policies that biased trade in favor of within-empire 
trade, or the extent to which an empire succeeded in reducing transactions costs.  
Columns 2 and 3 exploit the panel nature of the data by estimating country-fixed effects 
and country-year fixed effects. Columns 4 and 5 report the results from the dyad-pair and dyad-
pair-year, fixed-effects models. The results are robust to these alternative specifications in that 
                                                           
18 Foreign countries often report their bilateral trade in pounds sterling during the classical gold standard period. 
This explains why the sample shrinks nearly 50 percent when we include exchange rate volatility. We were forced to   14
all the models show a strong positive association between empire membership and bilateral trade 
flows. Depending on the specification, the point estimates suggest that empire boosted bilateral 
trade between 54 and 486 percent.
19 Including a term for time-varying multilateral trade 
resistance also does not reduce the size of the empire effect (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003).
20  
In terms of other determinants of trade, being on the gold standard increases bilateral 
trade by between 18 to 57 percent. The currency union variable is significant and positive in the 
three out of the four specifications. Exchange rate volatility has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on bilateral trade flows in the two country-pair fixed effects models. Interstate 
conflict generally does not have a statistically significant effect on trade in the different empirical 
specifications even when the joint significance of the lagged variables is tested.  
The possibility that the flag may have followed trade could produce biased results in the 
OLS and panel regressions. That is, empires may have colonized areas where there were already 
well-established trade ties or where there was potential for strong trade linkages between the 
region and the metropole.
21 To control for this source of endogeneity, we use an instrumental 
variables model. Our instrument for empire is the five-year lagged value of the size of other 
empires (measured by area). Our constructed instrument suggests that an empire, such as 
England, may have increased its size, in part, because it felt threatened – economically, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rely on other primary and secondary sources for bilateral exchange rate data. 
19 As a robustness check, we also estimated a difference-in-differences model. By differencing the dependent 
variable and including year dummies we are able to control for country-specific and global trends in trade that might 
be driving the large empire effect found in the OLS and panel regressions. The difference-in-differences estimator 
shows that membership in an empire (and its 5-and 10-year lagged effects) increased trade approximately one 
percent per year (not reported). The empire effect is statistically significant at the one-percent level of significance 
in all regressions.  
20 It may be the case that some bilateral trade is zero or close to zero in our sample. To deal with this issue, we also 
estimated a series of Tobit and median regressions. For both of these specifications, the empire effect on trade 
remains large, positive, and statistically significant.  
21 Frieden (2006, p.74) suggests that it is a matter of “continuing controversy how important foreign economic 
interests were in colonial expansion.”   15
politically, or militarily – by France or Germany’s territorial acquisitions. Historians have noted 
that this was a primary reason why the “Great Powers” sought out new colonies during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. For example, historians have described the dramatic 
expansion by European powers in Africa as a “scramble” that was unsuccessfully held in check 
by the failed partition arrangement of the Berlin Conference in 1884-5. Germany’s expansion 
beyond Africa and into the Middle East and Far East led British policymakers to worry about this 
new European colonial rival; Bismarck, in turn, seemed to have decided to engage Germany in 
territorial expansion as a response to what he saw as aggressive actions of European rivals 
(Townsend, 1996, p.71, 87). America’s growing naval power and acquisitions in the Caribbean 
and the Philippines in 1898 signaled the presence of a new rival to the West and led to territorial 
disputes in South America. And Britain and France competed in Asia over areas once occupied 
by China (Porter, 1999).  
Since our instrumental variable tracks the growth of other empires, it is likely to be 
highly correlated with the empire dummy variable, but uncorrelated with bilateral trade of a 
given empire. The first stage regression suggests that we likely do not suffer from a “weak” 
instrument problem.
22 The results from the instrumental variables estimation are very similar to 
the baseline regressions as well as the fixed effect specifications. Empire membership 
significantly increases trade. 
To provide some additional insight into the effects of colonization on trade, consider the 
trade of West Africa an area of new colonization in the late nineteenth century. Exports, such as 
groundnut oil, which was used as a substitute for olive oil and palm oil to lubricate machinery, 
more than quadrupled between 1897 and 1913. The export boom was especially pronounced in 
                                                           
22 The five-year lagged value for the land area of other major empires is significant at the one-percent level as an 
instrument in the first stage regression. The R-squared in the first stage regression is approximately 90 percent.     16
the British colonies of Nigeria and Gold Coast and the French colonies of Senegal and Ivory 
Coast. In Nigeria, groundnut exports went from a few million pounds to over 130 million 
pounds. Cocoa exports boomed in the Gold Coast and timber exports from the Ivory Coast 
increased by a factor of six in twenty years (Frieden, 2006). In return, these colonies began to 
import European manufactures. In Indochina (under the French colonial regime), the land under 
cultivation dramatically increased, allowing it to become the third largest producer of rice in the 
world. In British Malaya, tin became the most important commodity export, supplying half of the 
world’s demand, and after 1900, Malay and British Ceylon (already exporting large quantities of 
tea and coconuts) became major exporters of rubber (Frieden, 2006).  
 
B. Robustness Checks 
 
To test whether our results are sensitive to the specification of the econometric model, we 
also conducted a series of robustness checks. We first test whether the inclusion of gross 
domestic product (GDP) – a measure of country “mass” that is widely used in gravity models 
that analyze the modern period (when estimates of GDP are widely available for most countries) 
– changes our results. We include GDP for all countries and colonies for which reliable historical 
estimates have been assembled by employing the data set of Clemens and Williamson (2004).
23 
Their data set includes estimates for 35 countries and colonies and is assembled using a variety 
of sources including Maddison (1995). The inclusion of GDP reduces the sample size to 
approximately 6,700 observations; however, as shown in Appendix Table 1, membership in an 
empire still has an economically large and statistically significant effect on bilateral trade flows. 
Using this more limited sample of countries and colonies, membership in a colonial empire   17
raises trade between 158 and 779 percent in the dyad and country fixed-effects specifications.
24 
The other variables in the gravity model generally have the correctly predicted signs and are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. GDP is positive and statistically significant. 
Bilateral trade flows are lower for countries/colonies that are located farther away from each 
other and in cases where they are landlocked. Countries and colonies that border one another 
have greater trade, and membership in a non-empire currency union raises trade in three out of 
the four specifications. Although adherence to the gold standard raises bilateral trade flows, the 
effect is only statistically significant in the dyad fixed-effects model. The most notable change in 
the empirical results from the baseline regressions is the statistical insignificance of the 
population variable, which has a correlation coefficient of nearly 90 percent with the GDP 
variable. The fact that these two variables are so highly correlated suggests that we are losing 
very little in our analysis when we include population to analyze the broader sample of countries 
and colonies contained in our bilateral trade database.     
 
IV. What explains the “Empire Effect”?  
 
Our empirical results suggest that being part of an empire in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries had a large positive and statistically significant effect on trade. In this section, 
we hope to shed further light on this finding by exploring some of the channels through which 
empire may have boosted bilateral trade flows. Although there are many possible ways in which 
a particular colony’s trade was directly impacted by “membership” in an empire, our aim is to 
examine general effects that can be discerned across empires and over time. We focus on two 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
23 We thank Michael Clemens for generously providing these data. 
24 We estimated a country fixed effects model with year dummies.    18
channels that both economists and historians have highlighted as important determinants of 
trade: (1) trade policy and (2) transactions costs.  
 
A. Trade Policy 
 
Trade policies of metropoles may have been shaped by colonial ties. Economists have 
recently suggested that European powers viewed colonies as a way of setting up preferential 
trading relationships (EFT, 2002) and of ensuring markets (Alesina, 2002).
25 This system of 
trade preferences and agreements between an empire and its colonies often took three different 
forms: (1) policies of tariff assimilation/customs union, (2) preferential tariff policies, and/or (3) 
“open door” policies. The policy of tariff assimilation is a policy regime where the tariff rates on 
goods are the same in the metropole and the colony. Under this arrangement, the metropole and 
colony form a customs union. A preferential tariff system describes a trade policy where colonies 
and the mother country have differential tariffs, but non-empire goods are generally taxed at a 
higher rate. An “open door” trade policy refers to a tariff regime where there is no distinction 
made between the products of the mother country and non-empire trading partners. In other 
words, a colony or metropole with an “open door” trade policy does have not a preferential tariff 
policy or trade agreement (i.e., customs union) with some of its trading partners. The open door 
trade policy should not be confused with a free trade policy, however. Many countries with 
                                                           
25 Alesina (2002, p.20) quotes the British premier’s response to the French ambassador in 1897 to make his case:  “If 
you were not such persistent protectionists you would not find us so keen to annex territories.” One could perhaps 
also view the motivation for preferential trade arrangements in light of the earlier literature on economic 
imperialism. Hobson (1902) and Lenin (1916) suggested that capitalist economies needed to acquire colonies in 
order to sustain themselves; securing favorable terms for trade with colonies may have been another way to sustain 
their economies. Of course, these writers emphasized flows of financial capital rather than trade flows as the 
motivation for acquiring colonies.   19
“open door” policies levied duties to protect local industries or to raise revenue for the fiscal 
authority (Colonial Tariff Policies, 1922).  
From the colonizer’s perspective, Britain was the least protectionist of the imperial 
powers as of 1913.
26 According to Bairoch (1989, p.139), average tariff rates on imported 
manufacturers were around 13 percent in Germany, over 20 percent in France, over 40 percent in 
the United States, and more than 80 percent in Russia. Table 3 breaks down the trade policies of 
the major empires during the era of high imperialism. Great Britain generally maintained an open 
door policy during the gold standard period, while many of the British colonies in the West 
Indies (such as Jamaica, British Guiana, and the Bahamas) adopted differential import duties to 
promote domestic industries. The British Dominions – Canada, Australia (in particular, Victoria) 
, New Zealand, and South Africa – also implemented preferential trading agreements in favor of 
Great Britain between 1898 and 1907 – to protect domestic producers and manufacturers 
(Colonial Tariff Policies, 1922). On the other hand, France and most of its colonies adopted tariff 
assimilation or a customs union as its predominant trade policy in 1892. Under this regime, 
colonies enjoyed free trade with France for most products while non-colonies were charged 
tariffs to promote trade within the empire. As shown in Table 3, Algeria, Indo-China, and Tunis, 
three of France’s most important colonies, formed a customs union with the metropole. Many of 
its remaining colonies, including French West Africa as well as its island dependencies adopted 
open door or preferential trading policies. 
The smaller colonial empires tended to have a more uniform colonial trade policy.  For 
example, colonies of the Belgian, Dutch, and German empires had open-door trading policies 
and low to moderate tariffs that were levied strictly for revenue purposes. Spain, Portugal, and 
the United States generally adopted preferential tariff systems with its colonies. There were a   20
few exceptions, however. Macao, Portuguese Congo, the Canal Zone, and American Samoa had 
open door trade policies, and the United States maintained a customs union with Puerto Rico 
after acquiring the colony in the Spanish-American War in 1898.  
 
B. Transactions Costs 
 
A second channel through which membership in an empire may have benefited international 
trade is by lowering transactions costs and payments frictions. One way empires reduced 
payments frictions was by promoting a common language among merchants. Even in cases 
where the dominant language of the population differed from that of the imperial power, a lingua 
franca often developed around commercial centers (Ferguson, 2002). Since trade in the 18
th 
century and early 19
th century had been initially organized around principles of mercantilism and 
imperial preference, all else equal, merchants had a financial incentive to learn the language of 
colonial masters in order to sell more goods. Even as the incentive to learn “colonial” languages 
receded as trade relationships changed over time, the process was path dependent: the foreign 
language of the imperial power continued to be used by merchants.  
Merchants who had been trading within an empire were already acclimated to local 
customs and habits. They had well-established contacts and may have developed social networks 
as well as distribution and marketing channels for buying and selling goods; this would tend to 
lower the transactions costs associated with trade. Greif (1997), McMillan (1997), and McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999) have noted the importance of informal relationships in fostering deals 
where laws of contract are weak; social networks can, in turn, support contracting and foster 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
26 The average level of import duties on manufactures was approximately zero for the United Kingdom.   21
trade (Rauch and Trindade 2002). The historical record suggests that colonial officials were often 
urged to foster ties between locals and merchants.
27 
  Finally, empires may have also reduced transaction costs associated with trade via the 
widespread propagation and use of colonial currencies. As discussed above, previous scholarship 
on currency unions has highlighted the role of the gold standard in reducing payments frictions, 
but during this period other “currency unions” also existed. The Latin Monetary Union (LMU) 
and Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU) were included in the gravity models estimated in 
Section III, but during our sample period, some colonies also participated in less formal 
monetary arrangements that functioned like currency unions (Monetary Systems of the Colonies, 
1950). Table 4 displays the considerable cross-sectional and times-series variation in the 
establishment and formation of currency unions within colonial empires during the classical gold 
standard period. Belgium, Dutch, and French colonies generally linked up to their respective 
metropoles’ currencies to form a fixed-exchange-rate area. The United States introduced the 
dollar in its dependencies after acquiring many of its colonies in the Spanish-American War of 
1898. British and German colonies, on the other hand, either joined the sterling or mark block or 
formed currency unions with other colonies in the region. British colonies in East Africa, for 
example, formed a silver rupee union with India that also included some areas in East Africa that 
were members of the German Empire. Brunei, Johore, Labuan, and the Straits Settlements also 
formed a currency union while British colonies in West Africa left the sterling union to form a 
West African (Silver) Currency Union in 1913.  
  Although many different currency unions were formed within and even across the 
colonial empires, the pound sterling remained the largest and most important currency during the 
classical gold standard period. As the pound sterling became the preferred means for settling 
                                                           
27 See Frieden (2006, pp.90-1) for discussion of this point.   22
accounts, countries and colonies began to hold sterling balances with foreign banks, which set up 
offices in London, and the sterling functioned as the reserve currency of the world. Thus, while 
previous research points to the gold standard as playing an important role in reducing payments 
frictions, and currencies like the pound sterling were “as good as gold,” it may have been the 
case that sterling was in many ways better than gold. It was more convenient in that British 
exporters and importers preferred to draw and be drawn on in pounds sterling. Investor and 
trader preference for carrying out transactions in sterling or sterling-denominated bills of 




C. The Effects of Transactions Costs and Trade Policies on Bilateral Trade  
 
Before assessing the direct effects of these channels on bilateral trade, we first assess 
whether trade policies and transactions costs are correlated with empire in order to provide better 
insight into this cross-sectional indicator variable. This exercise should help to “unpack” the 
empire variable that may bundle a package of economic policies and political relationships 
between a metropole and its colony. We do this by estimating a series of simple OLS regressions 
where we model the determinants of empire. Column 1 of Table 5 (Panel A) shows the 
regression of empire on a constant and the common language variable. Columns 2 through 5 of 
Table 5 (Panel A) show the contribution of including one additional variable to the variable(s) 
listed in the previous column. (The correlation coefficients are shown in Panel B of the table.) 
                                                           
28 For example, Butlin (1986) has noted that the use of the pound sterling was widespread in Australia and New 
Zealand.    23
Column 1 shows that common language (one measure of transactions costs) is positively 
correlated with empire and is statistically significant, although the R-squared in the regression is 
only four percent.
29 Column 2 augments the simple model with the number of years a colony has 
been a member of an Empire since the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. We include this 
variable to capture a reduction in transactions costs that may have arisen from the long-run 
relationship between a colony and its metropole, such as familiarity with local customs and 
culture, the development of distribution and marketing channels, or the formation of social 
networks – all of which may benefit trade or its participants gradually, over many decades. This 
measure of transactions costs has a positive and statistically significant effect on empire, and the 
fit of the model improves from four percent to more than 23 percent. Columns 3 and 4 augment 
the model with measures for customs unions and trade preferences within empires.
30 The two 
variables take a value of one if country/colony i and j were both members of the same customs 
union or had a preferential trade agreement with each other. The results show that two trade 
policy variables both significantly predict empire, but do not substantially improve the fit of the 
model. Column 5 adds a currency union variable for empire countries.
31 The currency union 
variable substantially improves the fit of the model. Despite the admittedly parsimonious 
specification, the trade policy and transactions costs variables explain more than 50 percent of 
the variation in the empire indicator variable. 
  Since the transactions costs and trade-policy variables are highly correlated with empire 
and also seem to capture a significant amount of the variation in empires across colonies, we 
                                                           
29 With respect to the colonial empires, settler colonies were coded as having a common language with the 
metropole. For example, British settler colonies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa were 
coded as having the same language as England.  As a result of the coding scheme, the language variable may also 
capture institutional differences. 
30 Customs unions and trade preferences are based on information from Colonial Tariff Policies (1922). 
31 The currency union variable for empire countries was coded using Pick and Sedillot (1971), 
www.dollarization.org, and Monetary Systems of the Colonies (1950).   24
now consider the extent to which these variables mattered for bilateral trade during the period 
1870-1913. We replace the empire indicator variable used in our earlier empirical models with 
the transactions costs and trade-policy variables described above. Table 6 reports country and 
dyad fixed-effects models. Consistent with the results shown in earlier tables, countries that are 
more distant trade less. Bilateral trade between two countries and/or colonies is increasing with 
miles of railroad track and population, and countries that border each other or are members of the 
gold club have greater bilateral trade flows. 
  The results in Table 6 also show that many of the channels we have quantified help 
account for the observed variation in bilateral trade across countries and colonies. First, the 
empirical estimates suggest that membership in a preferential trade agreement raised bilateral 
trade flows by 26 to 168 percent (depending on the econometric specification). The coefficient 
on the customs union variable is also economically and statistically significant. Membership in a 
customs union increased bilateral trade flows by 20 to 131 percent. This result provides a reason 
why, as shown in Table 2, the empire effect differed for Germany, France, and Britain. 
Metropoles differed in the nature and extent to which they set up explicit trade policies for their 
colonies.
32   
Table 6 also suggests that empire boosted trade by lowering transactions costs. Being part 
of an empire’s currency union significantly increased trade by 17 percent to 371 percent, 
depending on which fixed-effects model was used. The currency union effect in colonial empires 
may also be capturing the impact of monetizing many African colonies that historically traded 
very little with the rest of the world, and largely relied on barter to exchange goods prior to 
                                                           
32 It is possible that preferential trading agreements may have changed the way in which countries oriented their 
economies towards producing goods for the metropoles. If this were the case, then colonial tariff policies may have 
lowered the prospects of long-term economic development, as suggested by Lewis (1970). As we have indicated   25
colonization. Countries and colonies that transacted in a common tongue also exhibited greater 
bilateral trade – approximately 20 percent more than those that did not. This result suggests that 
a lingua franca was another way in which empires may have lowered transactions costs and 
boosted trade. 
The number of years that a colony has been part of an empire is also statistically 
significant in two of the four bilateral trade regressions, although the sign varies according to 
which specification is used. One interpretation of the positive relationship exhibited in the 
country-fixed-effects specifications is that trade in British Dominions, such as Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand benefited most from strong social networks and shared customs, whereas 
newer colonies (many of which were in Africa) had a different cultural heritage and therefore 
benefited less; these would constitute the remaining colonies included the two dyad fixed-effects 
regressions.  
It may be impossible to test empirically all of the ways in which empire impacted trade. 
The channels that we have identified nevertheless account for a significant amount of the cross-
sectional variation in empire and help shed additional light on the “empire effect” reported 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
throughout, the focus of this paper is to analyze the determinants of bilateral trade flows and the impact of empire on 
international exchange rather than to construct a counterfactual of trade in the absence of empire.      
33 We also tested for the possibility that metropoles may have increased bilateral trade by building out or financing 
infrastructure development in their colonies. The infrastructure variable, defined as the interaction between empire 
and railroads was only statistically significant in the fixed-effects model. However, the coefficient on infrastructure 
in the fixed-effects model was not economically significant; empire*railroads increased bilateral trade flows by 
approximately 0.2 percent.    26
V. Conclusion 
 
What is the impact that empires have on trade flows? Do metropoles use their political 
control to tilt the balance of trade through preferential trade policies or customs unions? Do they 
lower transactions costs by standardizing language and currency and creating social networks? 
We provide some perspective on these questions using a new database of over 21,000 bilateral 
trade pairs collected from primary sources for the period 1870-1913. We find strong empirical 
evidence that membership in an empire more than doubled bilateral trade during the Age of High 
Imperialism. Moreover, it was quantitatively more important in explaining bilateral trade flows 
during the first era of globalization than either membership in the gold standard or a non-empire 
currency union. This empire effect appears to be robust to a variety of econometric 
specifications, including instrumental variables regressions, fixed-effects specifications that 
account for multilateral resistance, propensity score estimates, and a number of selection models.  
We suggest two broad channels through which empire may have boosted trade during 
this period: transactions costs and trade policies. Our empirical findings suggest that membership 
in an empire-currency union, sharing a common language, preferential trading agreements and 
customs unions were important in accounting for the observed variation in bilateral trade flows. 
Moreover, variation in colonial trade policies and currency-union arrangements helps to explain 
why the effect that empires have on trade differ. Empire currency unions were especially 
prevalent in the British, French, and German Empires while preferential trading agreements were 
widely used by France and some of the British Dominions. Although we have not fully 
accounted for all the channels through which empire may have impacted trade, transactions costs 
and trade policies account for over 50 percent of the cross-sectional variation in empire, and   27
appear to have played a significant role in boosting trade within empires during the Age of High 
Imperialism.  
An interesting avenue for future research would be to analyze how the positive 
relationship between empire and trade impacted productivity and economic growth.
34 For 
example, metropoles may have increased productivity by creating “free trade” zones that 
promoted competition and intercolonial trade. The free trade systems established by empires may 
have promoted specialization within colonies and increased their productivity. This would be 
consistent with a model developed by Alcala and Ciccone (2004) where the greatest impact of 
trade on productivity occurs in the traded goods sector rather than the non-traded, service sector 
through a Balassa-Samuelson effect.
35 
In creating the machinery for trade (that sometimes included a new production 
technology and an enhanced market with a quasi-monopsonist buyer of exports), empires may 
have also imparted institutions that either fostered or undermined productivity and growth. Some 
scholars have argued that trade can transform political institutions and foster the development of 
property rights, which in turn can lead to greater investment and growth as it did in the North 
Atlantic economies between 1500-1850 (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005). Some settler 
colonies’ institutions, for example, may have benefitted favorably from the trade and openness 
that the British empire promoted. On the other hand, empires may have undermined long-run 
productivity and growth by leaving extractive institutions, such as those suggested by Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001). 
                                                           
34 For an analysis of the impact of trade and growth or income levels, see Frankel and Romer (1999) and Irwin and 
Tervio (2002). 
35 The Balassa-Samuelson effect can cause changes in the relative price of nontradable goods, which introduces a 
bias in the use of nominal openness to measure the productivity gains from trade. Alcala and Ciccone employ a 
measure of real openness, measured as imports plus exports in exchange rate US$ divided by GDP in purchasing 
power parity US$, to control for cross-country differences in the relative price of non-tradable goods. 
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Understanding the relationship between empire and trade and long-run outcomes such as 
productivity and growth is complicated by the fact that the institutional footprints of empires 
varied, not only across empires and colonies, but even within colonies. For example, some 
colonies’ exports were produced in very controlled plantations systems whereby colonists owned 
and controlled the land and capital that coffee, sugar, rubber or other crops were grown on and 
employed low-wage, local labor in the production of these commodities. Other tradables sectors 
of the same colony may have been left untouched. This raises questions about how such parallel 
specialization impacted the growth prospects of these economies. To thoroughly assess the long-
run impact of trade and empire on productivity and growth, future research will need to examine 
the institutional variation within and across colonies as well as the changes in trade relations that 
took place after independence. 
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Table 1: The Effects of Empire on Trade, 1870-1913   
        








Empire Membership  1.306***  1.278***  1.502*** 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.25) 
Gold Standard  0.169*  0.263**  0.379*** 
 (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.14) 
Distance -0.557***  -0.561***  -0.565*** 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
Border 0.681***  0.627***  0.699*** 
 (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21) 
Number Landlocked  -0.307  -0.231  -0.076 
 (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.25) 
Railroad Track  0.184***  0.197***  0.144*** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Population 0.372***  0.368***  0.454*** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Non-Empire Currency Union  0.653*  0.619*  0.383 
 (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.36) 
War 0.165  0.217  -0.443 
 (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.27) 
War (-1)  0.418*  0.481**  0.678 
 (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.57) 
War(-2) 0.25  0.202  -0.16 
 (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.38) 
War(-3) 0.18  0.254  0.137 
 (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.34) 
War(-4) 0.008  0.012  -0.355 
 (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.37) 
War(-5) -0.056  0.018  -0.676* 
 (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.37) 
War(-6) 0.006  0.101  -0.44 
 (0.23)  (0.24)  (0.44) 
Exchange Rate Volatility      2.69 
     (2.93) 
Year Dummies  NO  YES  YES 
Observations 21630  21630  11045 
R-squared 0.41  0.42  0.47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
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Table 2: The Effects of Empire on Trade, 1870-1913: Sensitivity Tests and IV Estimates 















Empire  Membership    1.764*** 1.768*** 0.472*** 0.429***  1.331*** 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.04) 
British Empire Membership  1.168***        
  ( 0 . 2 0 )         
French Empire Membership  1.088*        
  ( 0 . 6 2 )         
German Empire Membership  1.017***        
  ( 0 . 3 0 )         
US Empire Membership  2.153***        
  ( 0 . 5 2 )         
Spanish Empire Membership  2.458***        
  ( 0 . 2 0 )         
Distance  -0.555*** -0.723***  -0.750***      -0.565*** 
  (0.07) (0.01)  (0.02)      (0.02) 
Gold Standard  0.302***  0.375*** 0.448*** 0.343*** 0.169***  0.260*** 
  (0.10)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
Border  0.635*** 0.595***  0.705***      0.623*** 
  (0.20) (0.04)  (0.04)      (0.05) 
Number Landlocked  -0.24 0.69***  0.747***      -0.225*** 
  (0.23) (0.12)  (0.13)      (0.06) 
Railroad Track  0.195***  0.096*** 0.636 0.187***  0.059*** 0.197*** 
  (0.03)  (0.01) (0.51) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
Population  0.364***  0.226*** 0.020 0.336***  0.127*** 0.371*** 
  (0.03)  (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) 
Non-Empire Currency Union  0.591* 0.802**  0.733***  0.568***  0.165 0.629*** 
  (0.32)  (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.11) 
Exchange Rate Volatility       -3.379***  -2.198***   
       (0.55)  (0.55)   
War  0.23 0.03  -0.254  -0.458  -0.512*  0.218 
  (0.21)  (0.22) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27)  (0.37) 
War(-1)  0.489** 0.372 0.170  0.771***  0.704*** 0.481 
  (0.22)  (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25)  (0.38) 
War(-2)  0.213 0.218  0.122  -0.058  -0.015 0.202 
  (0.17)  (0.22) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)  (0.38) 
War(-3)  0.265  0.173      0.176  0.109  0.098  0.252 
  (0.17)  (0.22) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25)  (0.38) 
War(-4)  0.021 0.003  0.170  -0.323  -0.187 0.012 
  (0.21)  (0.25) (0.33) (0.25) (0.24)  (0.38) 
War(-5)  0.027 -0.013  0.024  -0.236  -0.181  0.019 
  (0.27)  (0.26) (0.33) (0.23) (0.22)  (0.38) 
War(-6)  0.116  0.071 0.108 0.029 0.139  0.101 
  (0.24)  (0.23) (0.30) (0.21) (0.20)  (0.37) 
Year Dummies  YES  NO  YES   NO  YES  YES 
Observations  21630  21630 21630 11045 11045  21603 
R-squared  0.42  0.69 0.76 0.26 0.33  0.42 
Notes:  Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * indicates significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level.   36
 
Table 3. Colonial Tariff Systems    
      
Countries Assimilated Preferential Open  Door 
Belgium     Belgium  Congo 
France  Algeria    
 
French Indo-
China    
  Tunis    
  Madagascar    
  Reunion    
  Martinique    
  Guadeloupe    
  New Caledonia     
  French Guiana     
  Gabon    
Germany     German  East  Africa 
      German Southwest Africa 
     Kamerun 
     Togo 
     German  Samoa 
     New  Guinea 




Britain    Dominions:  British India 
   Canada Newfoundland 
   Australia  Papua 
    New Zealand  Norfolk Island 
   Cook  Islands  Colonies in Asia: 
    Union of South Africa  Aden 
   Rhodesia    Ceylon 
     Straits  Settlements 
    Colonies:  Federated Malay States 
    Trinidad  Protected Malay States 
   British  Guiana  Hong  Kong 
    Jamaica and Caymans 
Weihaiwei(leased 
territory) 
    Turks and Caicos  Colonies in Africa: 
   Barbados  Nigeria 
    Leeward Islands:  Gold Coast 
   Dominica  Sierra  Leone 
   Montserrat  Gambia 
    St. Christopher-Nevis  British Somaliland 
    Virgin Islands  Kenva and Uganda 
    Antigua  Zanzibar and Pemba 
    Windward Islands  Nyasaland 
   Grenada  Egypt 
    St. Lucia  Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
   St.  Vincent  Other colonies: 
   British  Honduras  Gibraltar   37
Table 3 (continued).  Colonial Tariff Systems 
Countries Assimilated Preferential Open  Door 
   Bahamas  Malta 
   Fiji  British  North  Borneo 
     Brunei 
     Sarawak 
     Tonga 
     Solomons 
      Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
     Mauritius 
     Seychelles 
     Falkland  Islands 
     Bermuda 
     St.  Helena 
Italy   Eritrea 
Italian Northern 
Somaliland 
   Somalia  Rhodes 
   Libya   
Japan  Formosa   Kwangtung 
  Saghalin  
Kiacochow (leased 
territory) 
  Korea    
Netherlands     Dutch  East  Indies 
     Curacao 
     Dutch  Guiana 
Portugal   Mozambique  Macao 
   Angola Portuguese  Congo 
    Cape Verde Islands   
   Portuguese  India   
   Timor   
    Sao Thome and Principe   
   Portuguese  Guinea   
Spain   Fernandi  Po  Canary  Islands 
    Spanish Guinea  Spanish Morocco 
    Rio de Oro   
United 
States  Puerto Rico  Philippines  American Samoa 
   Virgin  Islands  Canal  Zone 
   Guam   
Source: Colonial Tariff Policies (1922).    38
 
Table 4. Empire Currency Unions, 1870-1913   
  Dates   
Belgium    
Franc Union    
Belgium Congo  1879-1913   
    
England    
Gold Rupee Union    
India 1898-1913   
    
Silver Rupee Union    
Aden 1870-1913   
Ceylon 1872-1900   
India 1870-1897   
Maldives 1870-1913   
Mauritius 1870-1913   
Seychelles 1877-1913   
Somaliland 1889-1913   
Uganda 1870-1913   
    
Sterling Union    
Australia 1870-1913   
Bahamas 1870-1913   
Barbados 1870-1913   
Bermuda 1870-1913   
Botswana 1870-1913   
Canada 1870-1913   
Cape of Good Hope/South Africa  1870-1913   
Ceylon 1870-1871,  1901-1913 
Cyprus 1878-1913   
Falkland Islands  1870-1913   
Fiji 1874-1913   
Gambia 1870-1912   
Gibraltar 1899-1913   
Gold Coast  1886-1912   
Ireland 1870-1913   
Jamaica 1870-1913   
Malta 1870-1913   
Natal 1882-1913   
New Hebrides  1878-1913   
New Zealand  1870-1913   
Newfoundland 1870-1913   
Nigeria 1880-1912   
Orange Free State  1870-1913   
Rhodesia 1891-1913   
St. Helena  1870-1913   
Sarawak 1906-1913   
Seychelles 1870-1876   
Sierra Leone  1880-1912     39
Table 4 (continued). Empire Currency Unions, 1870-1913 
Transvaal 1870-1913   
Trinidad 1870-1913   
    
Straits Union    
Brunei 1903-1913   
Johore 1870-1913   
Labuan 1870-1913   
Straits 1870-1913   
    
West African Currency Union    
Gambia 1913   
Gold Coast  1913   
Nigeria 1913   
Sierra Leone  1913   
    
France    
Franc Union    
Algeria 1870-1913   
Guadeloupe 1870-1913   
Madagascar 1900-1913   
Martinique 1870-1913   
New Caledonia  1870-1913   
New Hebrides  1878-1913   
Senegal 1870-1913   
St Pierre and Miquelon  1870-1913   
Tunis 1891-1913   
    
Germany    
Mark Union    
German West Africa  1886-1913   
German SW Africa  1901-1913   
Togoland 1884-1913   
    
Silver Rupee Union    
Burundi 1904-1913   
Rwanda 1904-1913   
Tanzania 1888-1913   
    
Netherlands    
Guilder Union    
Indonesia 1870-1913   
Surinam (Dutch Guiana)  1870-1913   
    
United States     
Dollar Union    
British Honduras  1894-1913   
Hawaii 1898-1913   
Puerto Rico  1898-1913   
Sources: Pick and Sedillot, 1971; www.dollarization.org, Monetary 
Systems, 1950.   40
 
Table 5: The Channels of Empire, 1870-1913     
            
Panel A. Regressions          













Common Language  0.270***  0.187***  0.195***  0.189***  -0.028 
 (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
Years in Empire    0.011***  0.010***  0.010***  0.003*** 
    0.00   0.00   0.00   (0.00) 
Customs Union      0.519***  0.533***  0.182* 
     (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Trade Preferences       0.286***  0.281** 
       (0.10)  (0.13) 
Empire Currency 
Union         0.782*** 
         (0.03) 
          
Observations 22580  22580  22580  22580  22580 
R-squared 0.04  0.23  0.25  0.25  0.53 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix        













Common Language  1        
Years in Empire  0.16 1       
Customs Union  -0.02 0.16  1     
Trade Preferences  0.11 0.18 -0.02  1   
Empire Currency Union  0.32 0.46  0.21  0.25  1   41
 
Table 6: The Effects of Empire on Trade, 1870-1913     














Independent Variables      
Gold Standard  0.187***  -0.015  0.387***  0.183*** 
 (0.03)  (.05)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Distance -0.747***  -0.777***     
 (0.02)  (.02)     
Border 0.499***  0.601***     
 (0.04)  (.04)     
Number Landlocked  0.848***  0.919***     
 (0.11)  (.11)     
Railroad Track  0.099***  0.369  0.143***  0.030*** 
 (0.01)  (0.47)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Population 0.204***  0.340***  0.217***  0.063*** 
 (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Common Language  0.193***  0.253***     
 (0.04)  (0.04)     
Years in Empire  0.010***  0.008***  0.001  -0.004** 
 (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Customs Union  0.362***  0.838***  0.329***  0.179* 
 (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Trade Preferences  0.852***  0.984***  0.317***  0.235*** 
 (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Empire Currency Union  1.476***  1.549***  0.155**  0.255*** 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Non-Empire Currency 
Union 0.658***  0.653***  0.219**  0.048 
 (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
War 0.072  -0.070  -0.18  -0.161 
 (0.21)  (0.29)  (0.16)  (0.15) 
War(-1) 0.404  0.246  0.212  0.23 
 (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
War(-2) 0.253  0.255  0.077  0.127 
 (0.21)  (0.26)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
War(-3) 0.205  0.198  -0.017  0.024 
 (0.21)  (0.26)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
War(-4) 0.037  0.162  -0.061  0 
 (0.24)  (0.33)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
War(-5) 0.015  0.060  -0.078  -0.003 
 (0.26)  (0.33)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
War(-6) 0.11  0.141  -0.038  0.043 
 (0.23)  (0.31)  (0.16)  (0.15) 
Observations 21630  21630  21630  21630 
R-squared 0.7  .76  0.17  0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Appendix Table 1. The Effects of Empire on Trade including GDP Estimates,  1870-1913   
          













Empire  Membership  0.947** 0.960***  2.154***  2.174***  2.067*** 
 (0.41)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Distance -0.510***    -0.437***  -0.445***  -0.48 
 (0.10)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Gold Standard  0.193 0.122***  0.059  0.044  0.089 
 (0.14)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.07) 
Border 0.862***    0.856***  0.852***  0.804*** 
 (0.20)    (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Number Landlocked  -0.921**    -1.193***  -2.753***  1.538 
 (0.44)    (0.44)  (0.48)  (2.23) 
Railroad Track  0.203***  0.072***  0.072***  0.034*  0.617 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.07) 
GDP 0.448***  0.365***  0.627***  0.287***  -0.196 
 (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.67) 
Population -0.01  -0.019  -0.198  -0.187  2.042 
 (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (1.91) 
Non-Empire Currency 
Union 1.197**  -0.119  2.003***  2.021***  2.024*** 
 (0.50)  (0.23)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
War 0.424*  0.019  0.281  0.254  -0.031 
 (0.22)  (0.14)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.23) 
War(-1) 0.285**  0.115  0.287 0.252  0.212 
 (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.27) 
War(-2) 0.335*  0.266*  0.363  0.367  0.353 
 (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.31) 
War(-3) 0.24  0.07  0.252  0.248  0.368 
 (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.37) 
War(-4) 0.032  -0.007  0.095  0.084  0.094 
 (0.24)  (0.15)  (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.45) 
War(-5) -0.057  0.006  -0.005  0.016  -0.075 
 (0.30)  (0.15)  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.42) 
War(-6) 0.008  0.047  0.108  0.119  0.075 
 (0.29)  (0.14)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.36) 
Year Dummies  YES  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Observations 6671  6671 6671  6671  6671 
R-squared 0.49  0.41  0.68  0.68  0.75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 